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Unit Well Located on Unit Acreage 
Other than the Leased Premises
Voluntary Pooling
The effect on outside acreage of production during the secondary 
term from a voluntarily pooled unit, when the unit well is not 
located on the leased premises is resolved by ascertaining the intent 
of the parties to the lease. 6 Scott v. Pure Oil Co.,7 a Fifth
Circuit case arising out of Texas, and the most frequently cited case 
dealing with this fact situation, illustrates this principle. There 
the lessor granted an oil and gas lease on 317.93 acres, dated May 8, 
1936, for a term of "10 years and so long thereafter as oil and gas 
was produced from the land."8 The lease did not contain a pooling or 
unitization clause. Thereafter, on May 23, 1945, an amendment was 
executed by plaintiffs, assignees of the lessor, which granted the 
lessee the right to pool or unitize, with certain specified restric-
tions, the leased acreage, or any part thereof, with other lands for 
gas production. The amendment provided, inter a l i a , the following:
The entire acreage so pooled into a tract or unit shall be 
treated for all purposes except for the payment of royalties 
as if it were included in this lease, and production of gas 
shall be considered for all purposes (except the payment of 
royalties) as if such operation were on and such production 
were from the land covered by this lease, whether or not the 
wells be located on the premises covered by the lease.9
Lessee then pooled a portion of the tract with additional lands to
create a 675.24 acre drilling unit. A producing gas well was drilled
during the last year of the primary term on the unit but not on the
140 acre tract. After the end of the primary term, the lessee pooled
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the remaining 177.93 acres into a drilling unit and completed a pro- 
ducing well on that unit.
Plaintiffs then brought suit alleging that the lease had expired 
as to the outside acreage. They argued that production from a well 
located in the unit area but not on the 140 acres granted by the ori-
ginal lease was not such production as would perpetuate the lease into 
the secondary term as to the outside acreage.
In affirming the trial court's judgment, the court construed 
the language in the amendment as expressly providing that production 
anywhere in the unit was to be equivalent to production on the 
leased premises. The court observed.
The original lease provided that its terms would continue 
so long as oil or gas is produced from "said land". It is 
elementary that if gas or oil had been produced on any portion 
of the land covered by this lease during the primary term 
thereof, for as long as such gas or oil was being produced in 
profitable quantities the lease on the entire acreage would have 
been perpetuated. The amendment did not limit this provision, 
but enlarged upon it by providing that if gas were produced upon 
any acreage with which any portion of the land covered by the 
lease should be unitized, production would be considered for 
all purposes, except the payment of royalties, 'as if such 
operations were on and such productions were from the land 
covered by this lease, whether or not the well or wells be 
located on the premises by this lease: - - -
...........  it is clear that production on the unitized tract
fulfilled the requirement for production in the original lease 
and that its terms were perpetuated upon the entire acreage 
herein described.
The Court cited an earlier Arkansas case, Gray v.
Cameron,11 which reached the same result.12 There the parties executed 
in 1944 an oil and gas lease covering 35 acres in the Haynesville 
field in Columbia County. Eighty acre spacing had been established 
for the field by the Oil and Gas commission. The lease contained a 
clause which allowed the lessee to pool or unitize adjoining tracts
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to constitute a drilling unit. Another clause also provided:
Drilling or production shall be taken and accepted as 
drilling, producing, and lease operations under the terms 
of each and all of the oil and gas leases referred to 
above, and such operations . . .  on any part of the unitized 
area shall have the same effect as if such operations. . . . 
had been done on, or such production obtained from, each and all 
of the tracts in said communitized area, to the end that such 
operations* * * shall continue all of said oil and gas leases 
above mentioned in full force * * * as to all of the lands 
covered by this communitization agreement, and as to all of the 
lands covered by any and all of said leases so long as there 
may be production on the unitized area.13
Pursuant thereto, the parties entered into a unitization 
agreement in which only 8.81 acres of lessor's tract was included in 
the unit. Production was secured on the tract. The facts do not 
indicate, however, whether the well was located off the lessor's 
tract. In 1950, lessor brought suit to cancel the lease as to the 
acreage located outside the unit and for damages for breach of the 
implied covenant to reasonably develop that acreage. The trial court 
held that the unitization agreement supplemented the 1944 lease and 
according to the terms thereof, the lessee expressly retained 
control of the disputed acreage.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, affirmed, with Justice 
George Rose Smith dissenting. The Court construed the effect of the 
unitization agreement as being two-fold: drilling and producing on 
the unitized area would continue the leases on the acreage within the 
unit; and, such production would also continue the leases "as to all 
other lands". Although the court did not expressly so state, some 
ambiguity as to the outside acreage may have existed in the unitiza-
tion a g r e e m e n t . 14However, as the purpose of the agreement was to 
guarantee a well for the benefit of all the affected parties, the court
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noted that, in the absence of fraud, undue influence, or overreaching, 
it would not ignore the language "all of the other lands covered by 
any and all of said leases. "15
Compulsory Pooling
The courts are split as to whether the entire lease will be per-
petuated into the secondary term by production from the unit, where 
the well is located off the leased premises. The majority rule is 
that such production will suffice to extend the lease into the secon-
dary term as to the outside acreage.16 This result is based either 
from a broad construction of the express language of the compulsory 
pooling order or statute,17 which typically provides that production 
from the unit well shall be treated as production from every leasehold 
that is encompassed within the unit, or from a general inference that 
the compulsory pooling scheme was not intended to affect the inherent 
indivisibility of the habendum or other clauses of the lease.
Hunter Oil Co. v. Shell,18 a Louisiana case, is a most obvious 
example. There, the lessee granted an oil and gas lease with a primary 
term of 10 years with the customary "thereafter" habendum clause.
Toward the end of the primary term, a portion of the leased premises 
was forced pooled, and a producing gas well was drilled on the unit 
but off the leased premises. The pooling order provided, inter alia, 
as follows:
production . . ., shall be treated, developed, and operated as one 
lease, one unit, one property, one tract; and drilling operations, 
drilling and production on any of the tracts included within said 
unit shall constitute drilling operations, drilling and production 
under the terms of each and every one of said leases. . . 
affecting the property included within said unit.19
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The lessor brought suit to cancel the lease as to the excluded acreage
on the ground that the primary term had expired as to such lands. The
trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff. In reversing the
judgement, the Supreme Court reasoned:
The pooling order specifically provides that drilling 
operations, drilling production on any tracts within 
the unit shall constitute drilling operations, drilling 
and production under the terms of each and every one of said 
leases. . .affecting the property included within the unit, and 
applies to leases in their entirety, and the drilling of a 
producing well in the unit . . . within the primary term 
of the lease complies with the obligation to drill assumed by 
the lessee under the terms and provisions of the lease, and pro-
duction in paying quantities from such a well constitutes pro-
duction from all the property described in the lease and main-
tains the lease in full force and effect.20
Also, the court noted that contrary to the lessor's argument, 
the pooling order had not segregated the obligation of the lessee as 
to the unit acreage or the excluded acreage. In effect, the indivisi-
bility of the habendum clause and the lessee's obligations thereunder 
were not affected by the conservation statutes.21
The minority view22 is represented by the Mississippi case of 
Texaco Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith.23 The lessor in 1939 executed a 
lease with a primary term of 10 years and containing the usual haben-
dum clause. The Gwinville gas field came into production as a proven 
gas field in 1944. Thereafter, the Oil and Gas board adopted 320 acre 
spacing regulations. Such a unit was established for an area which 
included lessor's 40 acre tract but not a non-contiguous eight-acre 
tract which had also been included within the lease. Voluntary 
pooling was affected as to the leasehold unit but the lessor refused 
to pool her royalty interests. A producing gas well was drilled on 
the unit but not on the lessor's lands. After the expiration of the
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primary term, forced pooling occurred. Lessor then executed an oil 
and gas lease to the plaintiff who later sought cancellation of the 
lease on the theory that it had terminated. The trial court rendered 
judgment for the plaintiff. As to that portion of the lease included 
within the unit, the court, applied the doctrine of equitable pooling, 
and held that the lease was perpetuated into the secondary term. As 
to the excluded acreage, however, the court held that inclusion of 
only a portion of leased land into a unit did not extend the lease as 
to the outside acreage beyond the primary terms. The court reasoned 
that, despite the obligation of a prudent operator to reasonably deve-
lop, permitting the lessee to hold the lease as to the eight acres 
without the payment of royalties or rentals resulting from the com-
pulsory pooling would result in an unconstitutional deprivation of 
property without due process and such a result was not contemplated by 
the conservation or compulsory pooling statute.24
Unit Well Located on that portion of the 
Lease Premises Included within the Unit:
Voluntary and Compulsory Pooling or Unitiza-
tion .
Regardless of whether the unit is formed by compulsory pooling25 
or unitization, it is generally held or assumed that production on 
that portion of the leased premises included within the unit keeps the 
lease alive as to all of the leased premises, including the acreage 
located outside of the unit, absent any provision in the lease to the 
contrary.26 As to voluntary pooling, this conclusion rests on a 
construction of the lease, typically focusing on both the "so long 
thereafter as oil and gas is produced on said land" language of the
- 7-
habendum clause, and the wording of the pooling clause which typi- 
cally provides "production on any tract within the unit perpetuates 
each separate lease after expiration of the primary term as if such 
production were on each separate tract". Such language is construed 
to preclude the "divisibility" of the habendum clause, i.e., applica-
tion to the leased premises within the unit but not to the acreage 
situated outside the unit.27 As to compulsory pooling, the conclusion 
also rests on a construction of the lease, and additionally, on the 
presumption that compulsory pooling, resulting in only a portion of 
the leased premises being included in the unit, was not intended to 
affect a division of the leasehold estate.28
THE PUGH CLAUSE
Lessors, who receive royalty only on that part of the leased premi-
ses located within the unit, will be dissatisfied with the effect of unit 
production on the excluded acreage under the habendum clause.
Their argument is that unit production will hold the excluded acreage under 
the lease indefinitely, during which time it will yield no royalties, 
and the lessor will be precluded from leasing to another operator for 
subsequent development.29 Responding to this argument, the 
courts have reasoned that the implied covenant30 of protection against 
drainge, reasonable development and further exploration require the 
lessee to develop the excluded acreage as an ordinary prudent 
operator.31
However, the implied covenants rationale has its drawbacks as a 
method to prevent the lessee from holding the outside acreage for mere 
speculation. To establish a breach of an implied covenant for failure 
to drill on the excluded acreage, the lessee will have to sue, bear the
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burden of proof and, typically, show that such a well, if drilled, 
would produce in paying quantities, i.e. quantities sufficient to 
recover the drilling, completing and operating costs, including a 
reasonable rate of return on the investment. 32 Enforcing the prudent 
operator standard by litigation is not only cumbersome, but expensive 
and uncertain of success.
Thus, the Pugh Clause evolved as a method to sever the excluded 
acreage from the unit acreage for purposes of the habendum clause. 33 
Only the acreage within the unit that yields royalties to the lessor 
is to be perpetuated beyond the primary term of the lease. Eradication 
of the traditional indivisibility of the habendum clause, and altera-
tion of the effect of the pooling clause or other provision which 
typically makes unit production equivalent to production coextensive 
with the leased premises, is the intent and effect of the Pugh Clause.
A simplified form of a Pugh clause appears as follows:
If operations can be conducted on or production be 
secured from the lands in such pooled unit other 
than that land covered by this lease, it shall have 
the same effect as to maintaining lessee's rights 
in force hereunder as if such operation were on 
or such production from the land covered hereby, 
except that its effect shall be limited to the 
land covered hereby which is included in such 
pooled unit.34
Obviously, variations in the language of the Pugh Clause are legion 
and difficult problems of construction may arise. Worthy of note for 
the prudent draftsman is the holding that a Pugh Clause which did not 
contain language descriptive of non-productive subsurface horizons was 
inapplicable to effect a "vertical" severance of such non-productive 
areas of the leasehold estate.35 Likewise, Louisiana cases hold that 
a clause drafted in reference to voluntary pooling was inapplicable
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to outside acreage held by production from a unit established by 
forced pooling. 36
THE STATUTORY PUGH CLAUSE
In 1977, the Oklahoma legislature amended the compulsory pooling 
statute to provide:
In case of a spacing unit of one hundred sixty (160) acres 
or more, no oil and/or gas leasehold interest outside the 
spacing unit involved may be held by production from the 
spacing unit more than ninety (90) days beyond expiration 
of the primary term of the lease.37
By its terms, the statute operates as a limited Pugh clause in that it
precludes production from satisfying the habendum clause as to the
outside acreage for more than 90 days.38
In the initial challenge to the legislation, Wickham v. Gulf Oil
Corp.,39 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the amendment operated 
prospectively and was inapplicable to leases in issue which were in 
existence at the date of the enactment. Thus, the constitutional 
objections of deprivation of property without due process and impair-
ment of the obligation of contract were deferred.40 Further constitu-
tional objections may be forthcoming.41 For example, since the act 
exempts from its operation units containing less than 160 acres, an 
equal protection objection may be made as to the prospective applica-
bility of the act.42
If the present statute is held unconstitutional, it will likely 
reappear in a form free of such objections. In the meantime, mineral 
practitioners in Oklahoma who represent lessees face the task of 
drafting a clause which is valid under the rule against 
perpetuities43 and which will allow the lessee to reacquire the lease-
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hold estate as in the excluded acreage upon its being "released" by 
the statutory "Pugh Clause". The Mineral Bar in other jurisdictions, 
in the meantime, must wait to see if the statutory Pugh Clause, will 
become an integral part of the oil and gas regulatory scheme.
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secondary term as to the outside acreage. In that case the 
habendum clause of the oil and gas lease provided:
"10 years and as long thereafter as oil, gas,. . . or 
either of them is produced from said land, or from lands 
with which said lands is pooled* * *Id. at 354.
The pooling clause also provided:
"The entire acreage so pooled into attract or unit shall 
be treated, for all pourposes except the payment of royalties 
on production from the pooled unit, as if it were included 
in this lease. If production is found on the pooled acreage 
it shall be treated or if production is had from this lease, 
whether the well or wells be located on the premises covered 
by this lease or not." Id at 355.
13. 218 Ark. at 143, 234 S.W.2d at 770.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Clovis v. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., 140 Col. 552, 345 
P.2d 729 (1959); Dubois v. Midwest Oil Corp., 219 F.Supp. 593 
(W.D. La. 1963); Harper v. Hudson Oil and Gas Corp., 299 F .2d 
238 (5th Cir. 1962); LeBlanc v. Dancinger Oil & Refining Co.,
218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950); Hunter Oil Co. v. Shell Oil 
Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947); Whittaker v. Texaco, Inc., 
283 F .2d 169 (10th Cir. 1963); Crews v. Superior Oil Co., 319
F .2d 532 (10th Cir. 196); Tyler v. Superior Oil Co., 223 F.2d 
479 (10th Cir. 1963).
17. See, 53 Ark. Stat. Ann. 115 (A-3) which provides as follows:
All operations, including but not limited to the 
commencement, drilling or operations of a well upon 
any portion of a drilling unit for which an integra-
tion order has been entered, shall be deemed for all 
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or interest included in a drilling unit formed by an 
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18. 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947).
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22. Diversity cases in federal courts in Oklahoma, predicting state 
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ance. The principal case is Whittaker v. Texaco, Inc., 283 F.2d 
169 (10th Cir. 1958). There, the lessee granted an oil and gas 
lease to a tract of land covering 303 acres. Prior to the end of 
the primary term, the corporation commission established 40 acre 
drilling and spacing units for an area which encompassed the 
leased lands. One such unit included only a portion of the 
leased premises. Thereafter, a well was completed on that unit 
but off the leased premises and a spacing order was entered 
which had the effect of forced pooling the mineral owners 
interest. At the conclusion of the primary term, the lessor sued 
to cancel the lease as to the excluded acreage. The trial court 
held that the lease as to the excluded acreage had been extended 
by a well drilled off the leased land but within a spacing unit 
established by the corporation commission. In affirming the trial 
court's decision, the court relied relided primarily on Panhandle 
Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Isaacson, 255 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1958) which 
had held that a defeasible term mineral interest is preserved as
to the excluded acreage by the completion of a shut-in gas well 
on the unit, but,not on the leased premises included therein. 
Obviously, as pointed out by Williams and Meyers, supra note 
2 at 669.14, "there may be ground for holding that a defeasible 
term mineral or royalty interest is extended by unit production 
in [this] situation as to excluded acreage, even though a lease 
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Circuit Judge Murray, in his concurring opinion in Whittaker, 
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is a longer period of time, from the date of 
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oil and gas board shall render such lease or leases 
on lands lying outside said unit ara void and of 
no force and effect, unless otherwise held by pro-
duction other than from unit production.
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120 acre tract therefrom to be affected. This resulted 
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by the original lease. As the owner of the lease, they now 
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under these circumstances. Their responsibilities as lessees 
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than it was before severing by unitization. 192 F .2d 6.
Also, the theory of abandonment may also be a viable remedy for 
the lessor. See, Buchanan v. Sinclair Oil and Gas Co., 218 F .2d 
436 (5th Cir. 1955).
32. For breach of implied covenant to protect against drainage, rea-
sonable development, see, respectively, Williams & Meyers, supra 
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Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained 
drilling operations on a pololed unit or units established 
as provided herein or by governmental authority shall main-
tain this lease in force only as to that portion of the 
leased premises included within such unit or units, and 
production from a pooled unit or units shall maintain this 
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36. Odom v. Union Producing Company, 213 La. 48, 141 So.2d 649 (1961); 
Bennett v. Siclair Oil and Gas Co., 405 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1968); 
Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F.Supp. 463 (W.D.La. 1957)
37. 52 Okla. Stat. Ann. §87.1(B) (1977).
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Statautory Well Spacing and Drilling Units, 31 Okla.L.Rev. 344,
348 (1978).
39. 63 P .2d 613 (Ok., Sp.Ct. 1981).
40. KUNTZ, supra note 38 at 355.
41 . The amendment may also violate the prohibition in the Oklahoma 
Constitution, Art. 5, Sec. 54, which restricts each legislative 
act to one subject that must be sufficiently identified in the 
statute. See, KUNTZ, supra note 38 at 353.
42. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1.
43. See, 6 American Law of Property §§24.57 (A.J. Casner e d . 1952).
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